I. INTRODUCTION

I
n the absence of signifi cant changes in policy, rising costs for health care will cause federal spending to grow much faster than revenues, putting the federal budget on an unsustainable path. The Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO) has prepared budgetary projections through 2080 under two different sets of assumptions about current federal laws and policies. 1 Those projections indicate that, under either set of assumptions, federal debt will continue to grow much faster than the economy over the long run.
Although long-term budget projections are highly uncertain, under any plausible scenario rising costs for health care and the aging of the U.S. population will cause federal spending to increase rapidly. Unless revenues increase at an equal or faster rate, the rise in spending will produce growing budget defi cits and accumulating debt. To keep defi cits and debt from reaching levels that could cause substantial harm to the economy, policymakers will need to increase revenues signifi cantly as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), decrease projected spending sharply, or implement some combination of the two.
Federal spending on health care drives much of the projected increase in total government spending. By 2035, CBO projects that the share of total federal spending for Medicare and Medicaid will more than double to 13 percent of GDP, up from six percent of GDP in 2008. Reducing the growth in government spending will be diffi cult in the absence of policies that slow the growth of federal health care spending.
Many experts agree on some general directions in which the government's health policies should move -typically involving changes in the information and incentives that doctors and patients have when making decisions about health care. Large reductions in spending will not be achieved without fundamental changes in the fi nancing and delivery of health care. The government can spur those changes by substantially modifying payment policies in federal health care programs and by signifi cantly limiting the current tax subsidy for health insurance. Those approaches could directly lower federal spending on health care and indirectly lower private spending on it as well. Yet, many of the specifi c changes that might ultimately prove most important cannot be foreseen today and could be developed only over time through experimentation and learning. Modest versions of such efforts -which would have the desirable effect of allowing policymakers to gauge their impact -would probably yield only modest results in the short term.
Another approach that has drawn interest recently would combine specifi c policy actions -to generate near-term savings and provide experience that would lay the groundwork for future savings -with a mechanism or framework to impose ongoing pressure for reducing the costs of health care. The effectiveness of that path would depend ultimately on the willingness of federal policy to maintain signifi cant and systematic pressure over time and would require tough choices to be made.
CBO has issued a number of reports that detail the unsustainable nature of the nation's current fi scal path and discuss some options for addressing that problem. In this paper, we summarize much of that work. We begin Section II by outlining CBO's long-term budget projections, detailing the current state of the federal budget. In recent years, CBO has presented two fi scal scenarios for long-term analysis: one that adheres most closely to current law and another that represents one interpretation of what it would mean to continue today's underlying fi scal policies. We use a metric often used by CBO to gauge the federal government's fi nancial status -the fi scal gap -which summarizes the difference between the government's expected long-term fl ows of revenues and spending in a single number. In Section III, we discuss the long-term outlook for Medicare and Medicaid spending and show that as a practical matter slowing the growth of government spending requires slowing the growth of government spending on health care. In Section IV, we review some options that CBO has analyzed which might help to reduce federal spending on health care relative to baseline. Section V concludes the paper.
II. CBO's LONG-TERM BUDGET PROJECTIONS
Long-term projections rely on numerous assumptions about economic and fi scal factors, and many different assumptions are possible.
2 For its long-term budget projections, CBO presents two scenarios that are based on alternative assumptions about the federal budget over the long term:
• The "extended-baseline scenario" adheres most closely to current law, following CBO's 10-year baseline budget projections for the next decade and then extending the baseline concept beyond the 10-year window. 3 The scenario's assumption of current law implies that many policy adjustments that lawmakers have routinely made in the past will not occur.
• The "alternative fi scal scenario" represents one interpretation of what it would mean to continue today's underlying fi scal policy. This scenario deviates from CBO's baseline during the next 10 years and beyond because it incorporates some policy changes that are widely expected to occur and that policymakers have regularly made in the past. Different analysts might perceive the underlying intention of current policy differently, however, and other interpretations are possible.
CBO projects that under both scenarios, primary spending -all spending except interest payments on federal debt -would grow sharply in coming decades relative to its historical relationship to GDP. Stimulus legislation and efforts to stabilize the fi nancial markets pushed primary spending up to 23 percent of GDP in fi scal year 2009, the highest level since World War II; primary spending is projected to decline to about 21 percent of GDP by fi scal year 2013 (CBO, 2010) . Figure 1 shows total health care spending under CBO's extended baseline scenario. For the most part, total spending for health care in the United States -that is, private and public spending -has risen steadily as a share of GDP over the past several decades. Between fi scal years 1975 and 2008, federal spending for Medicare rose from 0.8 percent of GDP to 2.7 percent, in part because of increased enrollment that climbed from 25 million in 1975 to 45 million in 2008. 4 Between fi scal years 1975 and 2008, total spending for Medicaid, including spending by the states, increased from 0.8 percent of GDP to 2.5 percent, and federal spending for Medicaid increased from 0.4 percent of GDP to 1.4 percent. Under the extended-baseline scenario, primary (noninterest) spending would be roughly 20 percent of GDP from 2012-2020. It would then begin a long-term upward trajectory, reaching 24 percent of GDP in 2035 and 32 percent in 2080. By comparison, under the alternative fi scal scenario, primary spending would be about two percentage points higher as a share of GDP than in the extended-baseline scenario throughout the projection period. If spending policies did not change and outlays grew to the projected levels relative to the size of the economy, maintaining a sustainable budget path would require a similar rise in federal taxation. The recent recession temporarily depressed revenues to a projected level of 15 percent of GDP in the 2009 fi scal year. But even typical revenue levels would be too low to support projected spending. Over the past half-century, total federal revenues have averaged about 18 percent of GDP -well below the level of projected spending under either scenario.
Under the extended-baseline scenario, revenues would reach higher levels relative to the economy than ever recorded in the nation's history. That scenario assumes that reductions in tax rates enacted in 2001 and 2003 will expire at the end of 2010 as scheduled under current law. It also assumes that the alternative minimum tax (AMT) will not be changed; thus, the AMT's reach would expand substantially over time because, unlike the income tax, it is not indexed to infl ation. 4 In addition, ongoing increases in real (infl ation-adjusted) income would push taxpayers into higher income tax brackets. For all of these reasons, the extended-baseline scenario implies that federal revenues will grow somewhat faster, on average, than the economy -increasing from 20 percent of GDP in fi scal year 2012 to 22 percent by 2035 and 26 percent by 2080. But even if revenues rose to those unprecedented levels, they would not be suffi cient to keep the budget in balance over the long term in that scenario. Federal debt held by the public would stay near 60 percent of GDP during the coming decade but then would gradually increase to 79 percent of GDP by 2035 and continue increasing indefi nitely. In the absence of policy changes, by 2046 the ratio of debt to GDP would be higher than the level that the United States experienced shortly after World War II.
By contrast, under the alternative fi scal scenario, expiring tax provisions that were enacted in 2001 and 2003 would be extended, and the AMT would be indexed to infl ation. As a result, revenues would grow only slightly faster than the economy, equaling 22 percent of GDP by 2080. Slowly growing revenues combined with sharply rising expenditures would create an explosive fi scal situation. As shown in Figure 2 , under 4 The AMT is a parallel income tax system with fewer exemptions, deductions, and rates than the regular income tax. Households must calculate the amount of tax they owe under both the AMT and the regular income tax and pay the larger of the two amounts. 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 the spending and revenue policies incorporated in this scenario, federal debt would surpass 100 percent of GDP in 2023 and exceed 200 percent of GDP by the late 2030s.
A. Returning the Budget to a Sustainable Path
How much would policies have to change to avoid unsustainable increases in government debt? A useful answer is the so-called fi scal gap. The gap measures the immediate change in spending or revenues that would be necessary to produce the same debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of a given period as prevailed at the beginning of the period. As shown in Table 1 , under the extended-baseline scenario, the fi scal gap would amount to 2.1 percent of GDP over the next 25 years and 3.2 percent of GDP over the next 75 years. In other words, under that scenario (ignoring the effects of debt on economic growth), an immediate and permanent reduction in spending or an immediate and permanent increase in revenues equal to 3.2 percent of GDP would be needed to create a sustainable fi scal path for the next three-quarters of a century. If the policy change was not immediate, the required percentage change would be greater. The fi scal gap is much larger under the alternative fi scal scenario: 5.4 percent of GDP over the next 25 years and 8.1 percent over the next 75 years.
The choice facing policymakers is not whether to address rising defi cits and debt but when and how to do so, which can be illustrated using the alternative fi scal scenario. If policymakers waited until 2020 to close the fi scal gap as of 2009 by altering spending, they would have to reduce noninterest outlays permanently by 10 percent of GDP.
5 If they waited until 2040 to close the fi scal gap as of 2009, they would have to reduce noninterest outlays permanently by almost 16 percent of GDP. Incorporating the effects of defi cits and debt on economic growth, which are excluded from these simulations, would make the impact of delaying policy changes even more severe. Long-term budget projections require a stable economic backdrop. For these projections, CBO assumed that even a large increase in federal debt would not affect economic growth or real rates of interest after the fi rst 10 years. 6 However, if debt actually increased as projected under either scenario, interest rates would be higher than otherwise and economic growth would be slower. The rising debt would reduce the size of the domestic capital stock and decrease U.S. ownership of assets in other countries while increasing foreign ownership of assets in the United States. Those changes would slow the growth of gross national product (GNP) and, as the debt burden rose, could eventually lead to a decline in economic output. 7 The effects would be most striking under the alternative fi scal scenario. CBO estimates that the increase in debt under that scenario would reduce the capital stock by more than 20 percent and real GNP by 9 percent in 2035, compared with the levels that would occur if the debt remained roughly at its current size relative to the economy. Under the extended-baseline scenario, federal debt would be less damaging in the near term but would lead to signifi cant economic harm in the long run. The economic effects indicate that actual fi scal pressures under current laws and policies would be even greater than CBO's long-term budget projections suggest, because slower growth would limit revenues and a smaller capital stock would imply higher interest rates on government debt and other fi nancial instruments.
Holding down the spiraling levels of debt projected under either scenario could therefore result in signifi cant economic benefi ts. However, accomplishing that goal would require some combination of substantial revenue increases and substantial spending decreases relative to current law. These changes would have their own economic and social costs.
One policy that would prevent the increase in debt would be to raise revenues in line with the projected rise in spending. As evidenced by the estimated fi scal gap, the required increase in revenues under that approach would be large. If the increase occurred through higher marginal tax rates, incentives to work and save would be reduced and economic growth would slow.
An alternative policy would be to hold the growth of spending in line with the growth of the economy. That approach would be all but impossible to achieve without signifi cant changes in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Many experts believe that reducing the growth rate of spending on Medicare and Medicaid will ultimately depend on poli-cymakers' willingness to put ongoing pressure on the health sector to achieve effi ciencies in the delivery of health care. Various approaches to reducing federal spending on health care relative to baseline projections are explored in Section IV.
Reducing other federal spending signifi cantly below the baseline levels would be diffi cult as well. Spending on Social Security has risen from almost four percent of GDP in the 1970s to almost fi ve percent today and will increase to six percent in 2035 as the baby boomers retire. Other non-health, noninterest spending averaged almost 14 percent of GDP in the 1970s but has declined to about 10 percent of GDP over the past 15 years -aside from the current burst of spending in response to the recession and the fi nancial crisis. As a share of the economy, such spending is projected to decline further over time in CBO's 10-year baseline.
From a purely economic perspective, slowing the growth of spending would generally impose smaller costs than boosting tax rates, although that conclusion is somewhat sensitive to the specifi c measures that would be adopted. From a broader social perspective, citizens and policymakers need to judge the importance of various government programs and the costs of restraining spending on health care, retirement benefi ts, defense, and so on. That is, lower levels of spending would help address the fi scal sustainability problem, but society would have to make diffi cult choices about which programs to scale back. The diffi culty of the choices notwithstanding, CBO's longterm budget projections make clear that doing nothing is not an option, as legislation must ultimately be adopted that raises revenue or reduces spending or both. Moreover, delaying action simply exacerbates the problem, as is discussed below.
B. The Accumulation of Federal Debt
For a path of spending and revenues to be sustainable, debt must eventually grow no faster than the economy. Persistent annual defi cits lead to larger and larger amounts of debt, which in turn require more spending for interest payments on that debt. Thus, even moderate primary defi cits (defi cits excluding interest costs) can lead to unsustainable growth in federal debt. Such large defi cits could result in capital fl ight from the United States, leading to a precipitous drop in the value of the dollar and an associated increase in interest rates, which could create pressure on the Federal Reserve to control infl ation. Furthermore, there are ongoing costs of debt: tax revenues would be needed to pay interest rather than to fi nance government programs, and reductions in savings, investment, output, wages and incomes would result relative to what would occur otherwise.
A useful barometer of fi scal policy is the amount of government debt held by the public as a percentage of GDP. As shown in Under the extended-baseline scenario, annual defi cits would fall to about three percent of GDP by fi scal year 2013. Debt would remain roughly stable as a share of GDP for the next decade. After that, however, growing spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security would lead to higher defi cits, and debt would once again increase faster than the economy. By 2035, it would equal 79 percent of GDP. Federal debt peaked at 113 percent of GDP shortly after the end of World War II, a mark that would be passed in 2046 under the extended-baseline scenario.
Under the alternative fi scal scenario, defi cits would decline for a few years after 2009 but then grow quickly again. By 2019, debt would reach 83 percent of GDP; thereafter, the spiraling costs of interest payments would swiftly push debt to unsustainable levels. Debt would exceed its historical peak of 113 percent of GDP by 2026 and would reach 200 percent of GDP in 2038.
Many budget analysts believe that the alternative fi scal scenario presents a more realistic picture of the nation's underlying fi scal policy than the extended-baseline scenario -because, for example, it does not allow the impact of the AMT to expand substantially. To the extent that such a belief is valid, the explosive path of federal debt under the alternative fi scal scenario underscores the need for large and rapid corrective policy changes to put the nation on a sustainable fi scal course.
Moreover, CBO's projections understate the debt that would accumulate under the two scenarios. Long-term budget projections require a stable economic backdrop; thus, for the purpose of the projections, CBO made assumptions that generated a stable real interest rate and stable growth in real wages and output. In effect, the analysis omitted the pressures that a rising ratio of debt to GDP would have on real interest rates and economic growth. Changes in the demographic structure of the population are likely to offset somewhat the effects of high debt levels on real interest rates. In the end, however, ever-growing defi cits and debt would lead to higher interest rates and slower economic growth.
III. THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND TOTAL HEALTH CARE SPENDING
Spending for health care in the United States has been growing faster than the economy for many years, posing a challenge not only for the federal government's two major health insurance programs, Medicare and Medicaid, but also for the private sector. Measured as a percentage of the nation's GDP, total spending for health care increased from 4.7 percent in 1960 to 15.2 percent in 2007, the most recent year for which data are available.
8 Total spending for Medicare and Medicaid (which for the latter includes 8 National health expenditures in 2007 totaled 16.2 percent of GDP. However, the concept of "total spending for health care" used in this report comprises spending for health services and supplies as defi ned in the national health expenditure accounts maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. That spending includes all expenditures on personal health care, governments' administrative costs and public health activities, and the net costs of private health insurance. It excludes two categories of spending that are part of national health expenditures: amounts invested in research and in structures and equipment.
both federal and state spending) rose from 1.7 percent of GDP in fi scal year 1975 to 5.7 percent in fi scal year 2008. Over the same period, net federal spending for the two programs rose from 1.2 percent of GDP to 4.1 percent.
9
The growth of health care spending in the long term will be determined primarily by growth in the cost of medical care per person. The aging of the population will also contribute to future spending growth, especially for Medicare, which will cover a growing number of benefi ciaries as baby boomers become eligible for the program and life expectancy continues to rise. Those demographic trends are also projected to increase costs for Medicaid by boosting the demand for long-term care. CBO projects, however, that spending for Medicare and Medicaid will increase much more rapidly than will their enrollments -because the programs' costs per benefi ciary are growing faster than the economy.
A. Underlying Assumptions for CBO's Projections of Health Care Spending
To estimate the federal government's net long-term spending for Medicare and Medicaid, CBO fi rst projects total spending for the two programs and then subtracts the nonfederal components -for Medicare, the premiums paid by benefi ciaries and amounts paid by the states from savings on prescription drug costs in the Medicaid program, and for Medicaid, the amount of states' spending. In its projections, CBO calculates premiums for Medicare as a fl at percentage of gross spending for Part B and Part D and holds constant the share of Medicaid's spending paid for by the states.
10
Spending for Medicare and Medicaid benefi ciaries that is not fi nanced through the programs, such as out-of-pocket payments and payments resulting from individually purchased Medigap insurance, is not federal spending, so it is included instead in the category of other health care spending.
In order to estimate the long-term growth of health care spending, CBO incorporated assumptions about how health care spending for an individual increases relative to the growth of GDP per capita. That concept -which is commonly referred to as "excess cost growth" -effectively removes general infl ation, the size of the population, and changes in the population's age composition from the overall growth in health care costs.
11 In 9 Those fi gures are net of premiums paid by Medicare benefi ciaries and amounts paid by the states representing part of their share of the savings from shifting some Medicaid spending for prescription drugs to Part D of Medicare. 10 CBO uses the typical average share of 57 percent for projections over the long term after expiration of the temporary increase enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 11 The effect of general infl ation is removed from excess cost growth because the growth of spending for health care is measured relative to the growth of per capita GDP, both of which are affected by general infl ation. The phrase "excess cost growth" is not intended to imply that growth in per capita spending for health care is necessarily excessive or undesirable. It simply measures the extent to which the growth in such spending exceeds the growth in per capita GDP, after adjustments for changes in the age composition of the population. CBO (2009b) and CBO (2007) provide more details about how CBO estimates rates of excess cost growth.
the fi rst 10 years, CBO uses historical patterns in excess cost growth as a baseline. After the fi rst 10 years, CBO assumes slowdowns in excess cost growth across Medicare, Medicaid, and all other health care spending.
12 From 1975 From -2007 , overall excess cost growth amounted to 1.9 percentage points. This measure captures the growth of total spending for health care, including payments from all private and public sources. As shown in Table 2 , excess cost growth during that period was 2.3 percentage points for Medicare, 1.9 percentage points for Medicaid, and 1.8 percentage points for all other health care spending -that is, spending by the private sector and by federal, state, and local governments for health care programs other than Medicare and Medicaid.
The It is diffi cult to determine, however, to what extent the slower growth in the past 15 years or so refl ects one-time changes (e.g., the spread of managed care) and to what extent the underlying trend has changed. Another consideration is that rates of excess cost growth in the Medicare and Medicaid programs are driven partly by changes in law and policy, which have expanded the programs and tried to limit the growth of their costs. Most notably, in 1983, Medicare implemented a prospective payment system under which hospitals are paid a predetermined rate for each admission, an approach that has reduced some of the program's costs. 12 In computing historical rates of overall cost growth, CBO removes the effects of changes in the age composition and size of the relevant population. Thus, for Medicare and Medicaid, CBO excludes the effect of increases in the number of benefi ciaries in the programs. For Medicare and for the overall growth of health care spending, it also removes the effect of changes in the age composition of the population. In contrast, for its projections of Medicare spending, CBO takes into account the projected life expectancy (time until death) of benefi ciaries as well as their age and sex as described in Sabelhaus, Simpson, and Topoleski (2004) . For Medicaid, CBO removes the effect of changes in the composition of the program's case-load -that is, changes in the portions of benefi ciaries who are children, disabled people, elderly people, and other adults.
In its projection methodology, CBO's approach to developing its long-term estimates differs from the treatment of the fi rst 10 years of the projection period (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) . For the fi rst 10 years, a detailed analysis of each program is used to estimate outlays from the system, and payment rates for most Medicare services are adjusted each year on the basis of the estimated rate of infl ation and growth rates of the relevant populations.
13
For its projections covering 2020-2083, CBO combined assumptions about excess cost growth in health care spending with projections of the growth and aging of the population and the growth of per capita GDP. CBO assumed that in 2020, the rate of excess cost growth would be 2.3 percentage points for Medicare and 1.9 percentage points for Medicaid -the average excess cost growth rates for the programs from 1975-2007. The rate for all other health care spending from 2009-2020 was assumed to equal its historical average of 1.8 percentage points.
As shown in Table 3 , CBO assumed that in later years of the 2020-2083 period, even in the absence of changes in federal law, excess cost growth would slow. As health care expenditures continued to increase as a share of GDP, they would disproportionately absorb people's income, allowing only slow growth in the consumption of goods and services besides health care. As a result, pressure to slow the growth of costs would mount as health care accounted for a larger and larger share of the American economy. The private sector and state governments would likely respond by instituting various changes. Employers would probably intensify their efforts to reduce the costs of the plans they sponsored -for example, by working with insurers to make health care more effi cient or by reducing the extent of insurance coverage. Insurers would probably raise premiums and increase out-of-pocket charges. Employees might react to the higher charges either by shifting to plans with lower premiums -and more restrictive coverage or benefi ts management -or by directly limiting their consumption of health care in response to their higher out-of-pocket spending.
It is impossible to predict with any confi dence how such a process would unfold and how much cost growth might slow. One simple and transparent approach is to set a path of excess cost growth that is consistent with a rule about patterns of households' consumption. In particular, CBO assumed that households overall would be unwilling to spend so much more on health care that, from one year to the next, the increase in such spending alone was greater than the total increase in consumption. By the end of the projection period, per capita expenditures on items besides health care would be stable under that assumption. As a consequence of that approach, CBO assumed that the rate of excess cost growth for other health spending in the last year of the 75-year projection period would be 0.1 percentage points as shown in Table 3 .
Having made an assumption about excess cost growth in other health care spending, CBO made further assumptions about the relationships between the excess cost growth rates for Medicare, Medicaid, and other health care spending to determine the projected cost growth rates for Medicare and Medicaid and thus the growth of total health care spending. On the basis of its own analysis and discussion with health policy experts, CBO assumed that without changes in federal law, the combined effects of the pressures discussed above would be to reduce Medicare's excess cost growth by one-third of the reduction that took place in the growth of non-Medicare spending. In other words, under a scenario in which the rate of growth of health care spending outside that of Medicare declined from 2.0 percent to 1.0 percent annually, Medicare's spending growth would decline from 2.0 percent to about 1.7 percent per year. Therefore, if federal law remained unchanged, the growth of spending for Medicare could continue to outpace the overall growth of health care spending.
In summary, CBO's methodology for its projections of health care spending is based on a detailed analysis of Medicare and Medicaid spending from 2009-2019; excess cost growth in all other spending for health care is held equal to its historical average of 1.8 percentage points. In 2020, excess cost growth in spending for Medicare and Medicaid is set equal to the programs' average historical cost growth of 2.3 percentage points and 1.9 percentage points, respectively. In 2021, excess cost growth in all three categories -Medicare, Medicaid, and other health spending -begins to slow. Over the very long term, excess cost growth for other (non-Medicare, non-Medicaid) health spending declines from 1.8 percentage points in 2020 to 0.1 percentage points in 2083. Under this set of assumptions, the rate of excess cost growth for Medicare drops from 2.3 percentage points in 2020 to 0.9 percentage points in 2083 and the rate for Medicaid falls from 1.9 percentage points to 0.1 percentage points; as a result, excess growth for all health care spending combined declines from 1.9 percentage points in 2020 to 0.4 percentage points in 2083, averaging 0.8 percent over that period.
B. Long-Term Projections of Spending for Medicare and Medicaid
Over the past 30 years, total spending for health care has more than doubled as a share of GDP. According to CBO's projections, under the extended-baseline scenario, that share will double again by 2035 to 31 percent of GDP. Thereafter, health care costs will continue to account for a steadily growing share of the economy, reaching 37 percent of GDP by 2050 and 46 percent by 2080 as shown in Figure 1. 14 In 2009, total spending for Medicare accounted for 3.5 percent of GDP and total spending for Medicaid accounted for 2.8 percent of GDP. CBO estimates that by 2035 spending for Medicare will have more than doubled to eight percent of GDP, and by 2080 it will have grown to 15 percent of GDP. CBO projects that the growth of spending for Medicaid will be slower than for Medicare because it assumes that the rate of excess cost growth will be lower and that the aging of the population will affect Medicaid to a lesser extent than it does Medicare. CBO estimates that total spending for Medicaid will increase to fi ve percent of GDP by 2035 and seven percent of GDP by 2080.
Although the rate of cost growth is projected to slow over the 2009-2083 period, the annual increase in the level of spending is expected to remain high. For example, for the fi ve years beginning in 2015, CBO projects that total health care spending under the extended-baseline scenario will increase from 19.2 percent of GDP to 21.8 percent. For another fi ve-year period, from 2035-2040, CBO projects that health care spending will rise from 30.8 percent to 33.3 percent of GDP. From one perspective, the percentage change during the latter period is much slower -eight percent rather than 14 percent. But in both periods, health care spending increases by about 2.5 percent of GDP.
Excess cost growth is not the only factor that drives increases in federal spending on entitlement spending more broadly defi ned to include Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. Both the aging of the population and excess cost growth push spending higher. CBO (2009f) compared future federal spending under two scenarios: one with an aging population but no excess cost growth for health programs, and one with no aging but with excess cost growth. CBO (2009f) indicates that aging is the more important factor over the next 25 years or so, accounting for 56 percent of the projected growth in spending by 2035. Over that same period, excess cost growth accounts for another 32 percent, and the interaction between the two factors causes the remaining 11 percent. For the period from 2035-2080, the picture changes, as aging accounts for 32 percent of 14 Under the extended-baseline scenario the assumption that current law does not change implies that the existing formula for determining the payment rates for physicians under Medicare (the "sustainable growth rate" formula) will continue to apply and will necessitate large reductions in those payments over the next several years. Under the alternative fi scal scenario, CBO assumed that Medicare's payment rates for physicians will grow with infl ation. Under both scenarios, CBO assumed that Medicare benefi ts would continue to be paid in full regardless of the fi nancial status of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund. Projected spending for Medicare under the alternative fi scal scenario is slightly greater than under the extended-baseline scenario, but the difference is small. Projected health care spending other than that for Medicare -including federal spending for Medicaid -differs only slightly under the two scenarios.
the increase in spending, excess cost growth accounts for 41 percent, and the interaction effect contributes 26 percent as shown in Figure 3 . If the interaction between aging and excess cost growth is allocated between the two factors and only increases in federal spending on Medicare and Medicaid are examined, excess cost growth accounts for 70 percent of the projected increase in spending by 2080. CBO projects that over the next 75 years, total spending for Medicare and Medicaid will account for a growing share of total health care spending -because the assumed rates of excess cost growth for Medicare will slow less quickly than will the rate for other health care spending and because a larger share of the population will be older than 65. In 2009, total spending for Medicare and Medicaid is projected to make up 37 percent of total health care spending. CBO projects that under the extended-baseline scenario, that ratio will grow to 41 percent by 2035 and to nearly half of all health care spending by 2080.
As a result of the relatively fast growth projected for total Medicare and Medicaid spending, net federal health care spending over the coming decades -that is, spending for Medicare excluding benefi ciaries' premiums and amounts paid by the states from prescription drug savings for Medicaid, together with the federal share of Medicaid's spending -will also make up a larger share of total spending for health care. The federal share will increase from 29 percent in 2009 to about 31 percent in 2035 and to 
IV. OPTIONS FOR REDUCING HEALTH CARE COSTS
Given the long-term fi scal challenges, very signifi cant and fundamental changes in health care will almost certainly be required to truly improve the long-run budget outlook. Of course, projecting the effect of health policy changes into the distant future is very diffi cult, partly because predicting how the practice of medicine would evolve in the absence of those changes is diffi cult. Therefore, experts generally focus on ways to reduce health care spending over the next decade or two rather than over the very long run.
16 Although a great variety of options could be discussed, this section describes two broad sets of approaches. One involves specifi c steps that largely focus on changing the information and incentives facing providers and patients. The other would reduce federal payment rates for health care services (or threaten such reductions) in an attempt to encourage greater effi ciency in the health sector.
A. Specifi c Steps That Could Improve Effi ciency
In a number of recent publications, CBO analyzed a variety of options aimed at reducing costs for health care, including (1) creating so-called accountable care organizations, (2) bundling payments to hospitals and other providers, (3) providing additional information about the effectiveness of medical treatments, (4) expanding the use of preventive and wellness services and primary care, (5) increasing cost sharing by patients, and (6) modifying the tax treatment of employment-based health insurance. 17 Versi ons of many of those options have been included in the health care legislation that has been considered by the House and the Senate, the effects of which have been estimated by CBO and (in the case of tax-related provisions) the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. We briefl y summarize the six options below.
Create Accountable Care Organizations
In Medicare's traditional fee-for-service program, providers have little or no fi nancial incentive to coordinate the care their patients receive across different treatment settings or to be accountable for the costs and quality of that care. One prominent example of a structure that may function better would be accountable care organizations formed by physicians and other health care providers. Under this model, providers would receive bonuses if they held down the total cost of the services their patients received during a year while also meeting requirements for the quality of the care; some versions would also impose penalties on doctors who did not meet those targets.
Bundle Payments to Hospitals and Other Providers
Another option would be to have hospitals receive a single bundled payment from Medicare for both the hospital services they provide and the care that their patients receive in a post-acute setting in the 30 days following their discharge. Hospitals already receive a fi xed payment per admission, but this arrangement would provide hospitals with a new incentive to coordinate the care their patients receive after they are discharged and to economize in the use of post-acute care. The payment amount could be adjusted over time to allow the federal government to capture part of the anticipated reduction in costs.
Provide Additional Information about the Eff ectiveness of Treatments
Concerns about the limited evidence that is available to determine which treatments are most effective for which patients has generated considerable interest in expanding the supply and use of information that compares the effectiveness of treatment options. Merely conducting and disseminating additional research, however, is unlikely to have major effects on patterns of clinical practice or health care spending. For new research to have a signifi cant impact, providers' fi nancial incentives would need to be aligned with the results. For example, legislation could allow the Medicare program to limit or deny coverage for treatments that were found to be less clinically effective or less cost-effective than other interventions. Alternatively, Medicare could tie its payments to providers to the cost of the most effective treatment, or patients could be required to pay for at least a portion of the additional cost of less effective treatments. In all of those approaches, patients and physicians could still choose the course of treatment they preferred, but Medicare's payments would depend on the broad results of research.
Expand the Use of Preventative and Wellness Services and Primary Care
Many proposals to modify the health care system include provisions to expand the use of preventive and wellness services and the use of primary care. Those changes could improve people's health and the quality of care they receive. For example, vaccines can prevent the spread of diseases, screening tests may be able to detect illnesses at earlier and more treatable stages, and greater focus on primary care can foster healthier behavior and better coordination of care. Although those policies could also lead to less overall spending on health care, the impact of specifi c preventive and wellness services on spending varies, depending on the disease being targeted and the population receiving the services. Designing such policies in ways that reduce federal spending for health care may prove to be diffi cult (CBO, 2009e) .
Increase Cost Sharing by Patients
Increasing the cost-sharing obligations that individuals face in government health programs (and private insurance) would strengthen the incentives for them to use medical care prudently. Research has shown that patients are responsive to the price they pay for many aspects of care (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group, 1993; CBO, 2008b) . To be sure, the rationale for insurance is to limit patients' out-of-pocket costs, so people with signifi cant health problems or with low income and few assets might not be able to pay a large share of their health costs themselves. Cost sharing could be designed to maintain appropriate fi nancial protection while still creating some sensitivity to cost. In addition, maintaining lower cost sharing for certain preventive services, medications to treat chronic conditions, and other care that would reduce future spending (which falls under the rubric of "value-based insurance design") may make sense. Still, ensuring that patients have some fi nancial stake in decisions about treatment methods could lead them to ask their doctors more questions about the effectiveness of different tests and treatments and to make better-informed and more cost-sensitive decisions about their care.
Modify the Tax Treatment of Employment-Based Health Insurance
Nearly all analysts agree that the current tax treatment of employment-based health insurance -which exempts most payments for such insurance from both income and payroll taxes -dampens incentives for cost control because it is open-ended. Those incentives could be changed by restructuring the tax exclusion to encourage workers to join health plans with lower premiums; those lower premiums would probably arise through a combination of higher cost-sharing requirements and tighter management of benefi ts. One option would replace the current tax exclusion with a refundable but more limited tax credit. Another option would limit the amount of health insurance premiums that could be excluded from income and payroll taxes to specifi c dollar amounts. Those approaches would change workers' incentives about how much insurance to purchase and how much care to demand, and could yield substantial increases in federal revenues.
B. Options for Imposing Ongoing Pressure to Reduce Spending
Vigorous implementation of the previous six specifi c options could save money for the federal government in the medium term; they could also lay the groundwork for long-term savings. However, many of the reforms would only reach fruition with substantial changes in how medicine is practiced. Therefore, the annual savings they generate might be modest, at least initially -as experts learn more from experience with innovative approaches to fi nancing and delivering care and as payment rules are adjusted to shift behavior further and capture savings for the federal government.
Another approach -which could be pursued independently or combined with the specifi c steps listed above -would be to create a framework for federal health care spending that imposes ongoing pressure to reduce spending over time, particularly in the case of providers. Such pressure could be imposed in several ways, including (1) reducing Medicare's payment updates automatically to take account of potential productivity gains, (2) reducing Medicare payments in higher-spending areas of the country, and (3) giving the Secretary of Health and Human Services broad discretion to change Medicare to produce savings, but imposing an across-the-board reduction in payments to providers if savings are not achieved in other ways.
Reduce Annual Updates in Medicare's Payments to Refl ect Productivity Gains
Under current law, Medicare's fee-for-service payments to caregivers in a variety of facilities (including acute care and long-term care hospitals, outpatient facilities, skilled nursing facilities, and home health agencies) are determined according to preset fee schedules. As use of information technology increases, some experts maintain that the health sector will undergo substantial productivity gains. Some of those gains may appear as reductions in the quantity of services and thus yield savings automatically for the government. However, most of the gains are likely to take the form of reduced costs per service, which would cut government spending only if the government cut the prices it pays. Imposing slower growth in payments would create ongoing pressure on providers to identify and adopt less costly approaches; it would also, however, create risks for providers and patients if the effi ciency gains were not achieved.
More generally, reducing payment updates in the fee-for-service Medicare system could also prove to be a powerful mechanism for shifting providers into new payment schemes and organizational arrangements. Anticipated large reductions in payments to physicians under the sustainable growth rate mechanism, for example, could provide an impetus to physicians to join accountable care organizations, where they might receive bonuses for low-cost care while maintaining quality. The effectiveness of that approach, however, depends on whether the provisions are maintained over time, which is often not the case for major legislation. For example, the sustainable growth rate mechanism governing Medicare's payments to physicians has frequently been modifi ed (either through legislation or administrative action) to avoid reductions in those payments, and legislation to do so again is currently under consideration in the Congress, as discussed in CBO (2009c).
Reduce Medicare Payments in Higher-Spending Areas
Another tack for applying ongoing pressure to restrain spending would be to reduce Medicare payments, or the growth in those payments, in higher-spending areas of the country. This approach would focus directly on reducing the geographical disparities that currently exist in health care spending, although it would not target specifi c medical providers or types of services that might be most responsible for the differences in spending. As with reductions in payment updates, this approach would create risks for providers and patients in higher-spending areas if the expected effi ciency gains were not achieved. The overall challenge in reducing the use of care that seems to be making little or no contribution to health is trying to distinguish that care from necessary care, and that task is made only somewhat easier by focusing attention on geographic areas where spending is relatively high.
Increase Discretion to Change Medicare with a Fallback if Savings were not Obtained
Another way to ensure signifi cant savings in Medicare would be to give the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or some governmental entity broad discretion to make changes in Medicare to produce savings -but also to impose an across-the-board reduction in payments to providers if suffi cient savings were not achieved in other ways.
Many experts think that broader discretion for the administrators of Medicare would help to encourage innovation and enhance effi ciency in any event. However, the fallback reductions in payments to providers would be crucial in encouraging providers to accept other changes in the program instead. Moreover, as noted above, this mechanism and others in this section would only be effective in the end if Congress allowed the legislated reductions in payments to take effect.
V. CONCLUSION
Under any plausible scenario, rising costs for health care and the aging of the U.S. population will cause federal spending to increase rapidly. The growth of health care spending in the long term will be determined primarily by growth in the cost of medical care per person. The aging of the population will also contribute to future spending growth, especially for Medicare, which will cover a growing number of benefi ciaries as baby boomers become eligible for the program and life expectancy continues to rise.
Large reductions in spending for health care relative to the baseline will not actually be achieved without fundamental changes in the fi nancing and delivery of health care. The government can spur those changes by substantially changing payment policies in federal health care programs and by providing incentives to individuals to choose less costly care. Those approaches could directly lower federal spending on health care and indirectly lower private spending on it as well. One broad approach would combine specifi c policy actions -to generate near-term savings and provide experience that would lay the groundwork for future savings -with a mechanism or framework to impose ongoing pressure to reduce spending on health care. The success of that approach depends on whether such pressure is maintained over time, which will involve making tough choices about how to limit increases in spending on health care.
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